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INTRODUCTION 
 The prospect of geoengineering, or the “deliberate large-scale 
manipulation of the planetary environment to counteract 
anthropogenic climate change,” carries with it a varied set of 
technical challenges.1 Yet it is the governance challenges 
associated with geoengineering that are likely to be far more 
difficult to overcome if deployment, or even large-scale 
experimentation, is ever seriously contemplated by the 
international community. Questions about decision making, 
political legitimacy, policy objectives, risk management, and other 
 
 *  We would like to thank our colleagues at the Harvard Kennedy School 
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs for their valuable insights and 
feedback on earlier versions of this article.  We would also like to thank the staff 
of the New York University Environmental Law Journal, whose considerable 
efforts helped refine both the manuscript and our overall thinking on the topic. 
 1  See THE ROYAL SOC’Y, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, 
GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY 1 (2009). 
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governance dilemmas have been raised with respect to both solar 
radiation management (SRM) and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) 
geoengineering methods. One particularly difficult challenge 
raised by commentators on geoengineering is the problem of 
liability; that is, how would international society deal with a 
climate engineering intervention gone wrong?2 In general, liability 
concerns are more novel and potentially more acute for SRM 
methods than for CDR techniques: carbon dioxide removal and 
storage present significant but relatively conventional liability 
problems related to carbon leakage and environmental impacts, 
whereas modifying planetary albedo introduces a range of possible 
side effects not previously encountered for which no direct 
governance precedents exist. 
Stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI), a fast-acting SRM 
technique that would introduce aerosol particles to the upper 
atmosphere to reflect a small amount of solar radiation away from 
Earth and thereby decrease temperatures, has received particular 
attention from the geoengineering research community, and much 
of this attention has focused on the governance challenges posed 
by questions of liability. If a country were damaged by negative 
effects from SAI, should that country be compensated for its loss? 
If so, by what mechanism? Could such effects be persuasively 
linked to SAI? Who should pay for damages, and how much 
should they pay? The extraordinary difficulties presented by this 
issue have led some observers to conclude that building a just and 
effective system of liability and compensation for SAI would be 
virtually impossible.3  In the absence of a credible liability system 
available as recourse in the event of miscalculation or accident, the 
international community would (arguably) be unlikely to agree to 
 
 2  E.g., SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, SOLAR 
RADIATION MANAGEMENT: THE GOVERNANCE OF RESEARCH 44 (2011); Adam 
D.K. Abelkop & Jonathan C. Carlson, Reining in Phaethon’s Chariot: Principles 
for the Governance of Geoengineering, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
763, 799–801 (2013); Daniel Bodansky, May We Engineer the Climate?, 33 
CLIMATIC CHANGE 309, 319 (1996); Lisa Dilling & Rachel Hauser, Governing 
Geoengineering Research: Why, When, and How?, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 553, 
560–61 (2013); David W. Keith, Geoengineering the Climate: History and 
Prospect, 25 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV’T, 245, 275–76 (2000). 
 3  E.g., Alan Robock, Will Geoengineering With Solar Radiation 
Management Ever Be Used?, 15 ETHICS POL’Y & ENV’T 202, 203 (2012); 
Bronislaw Szerszynski et al., Why Solar Radiation Management and Democracy 
Won’t Mix, 45 ENV’T & PLAN. A 2809, 2811–12 (2013). 
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any form of SAI implementation.4 Thus, future SAI 
geoengineering may be contingent on, among other things, solving 
the liability problem. 
Yet liability for stratospheric aerosol geoengineering is not 
necessarily as intractable as some suggest. Historical antecedents 
and contemporary methodological and legal innovations provide a 
strong basis for constructing a liability regime. Certainly, 
designing a liability regime would be no easy task, and any regime 
will be limited in both the risks it covers and its enforceability. 
However, there are more tools at hand to address SAI liability than 
it might initially appear. The world may decide at some point in 
the future that SAI is or is not desirable, but liability itself is 
unlikely to pose an insuperable obstacle to its implementation. We 
have chosen to focus on SAI in this Article for the sake of 
specificity; however, most of these arguments about liability and 
compensation should apply to other forms of SRM as well. 
Section I provides an overview of the concept of liability and 
its historical development at the international level. Section II 
examines the variety of potential harms stemming from SAI that 
any system of liability would need to contend with. Sections III 
and IV take a detailed look at how international liability and 
compensation have been addressed in the context of the Space 
Liability Convention and oil spill regime, respectively. Finally, 
Section V considers scientific and legal aspects of causal 
attribution in the global climate system, and Section VI takes up a 
number of additional issues related to SAI liability in a discussion 
Section. 
Two caveats should be noted here. First, any discussion of 
liability threatens to reduce the multitude of real damages suffered 
by victims to straightforward, simple monetary terms. This is true 
with respect to geoengineering as it is for all other fields, and it is 
important that researchers and practitioners bear in mind the full 
range of non-monetary losses that damages may incur, including 
emotional, spiritual, cultural, aesthetic, artistic, historical, and 
religious losses. However, it is also important to acknowledge that 
financial compensation for liability is widely accepted as the 
principal means of reparation in modern settings, and no functional 
replacement is readily available. As such, meaningful, policy-
 
 4  See Edward A. Parson & Lia N. Ernst, International Governance of 
Climate Engineering, 14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 307, 327 (2013). 
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relevant discussions of liability are unavoidably conducted on the 
basis of financial redress. 
Second, we are aware that research on geoengineering 
liability may be viewed as enabling a wider sociotechnical project 
grounded in particular conceptions of society, nature, technology, 
and humanity.5 We recognize that this research may add discursive 
momentum to the articulation of a geoengineering “imaginary.”6 
We remain agnostic about the ultimate role and value of this 
imaginary. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL LIABILITY 
The concept of legal liability originates in domestic law.7 
Liability was developed to help alleviate the tension between the 
belief that parties should not be made to bear the costs of activities 
carried out by others, and a societal judgment that certain 
activities, while inherently risky, ought nevertheless to be 
encouraged for the sake of the public interest.8 Legal liability held 
that such activities, for example, industrial production, ought to be 
permitted, however, third parties incurring damages as a result 
should be compensated by those who conduct and/or benefit from 
the activities in question. A system of liability serves not only to 
make restitution to victims of harmful activities in cases of 
accident, error, or negligence, but also fulfills a “preventative” 
function by encouraging those who engage in dangerous activities 
to exercise caution and adopt safe practices, in order to avoid the 
potential cost of reparations.9 
Initially, the normal standard for legal liability was based on 
fault;10 that is, liability was contingent on demonstrating both (1) a 
 
 5  See A. Rip & R. Kemp, Technological Change, in 2 HUMAN CHOICES AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE: RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY, 327, 348 (S. Rayner & E.L. 
Malone eds., 1998). 
 6  See Nils Markusson, Tensions in Framings of Geoengineering: 
Constitutive Diversity and Ambivalence 6 (Climate Geoengineering Governance, 
Working Paper No. 003, 2013).  
 7  See U.N Secretariat, Survey on Liability Regimes Relevant to the Topic 
International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not 
Prohibited by International Law, [1995] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 60, 66–73, Int’l 
L. Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/471 [hereinafter Survey on Liability Regimes]. 
 8  See id. at 67. 
 9  See PHILIPPE SANDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 700 (3d ed. 2012). 
 10  See Survey on Liability Regimes, supra note 7, at 67. 
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causal link between the act or omission alleged to have caused 
damage and the actual loss suffered, and (2) negligence or 
culpability on the part of the defendant. Causal linkage, and hence 
attribution of specific damage to a specific wrongful act or 
omission, was established by showing an uninterrupted chain of 
cause-effect relationships, none of which would have occurred but 
for the preceding relationship. As particularly hazardous 
(“ultrahazardous”) yet socially beneficial activities—such as 
keeping wild animals and using explosives—became more 
common, the competing standard of strict liability emerged, 
according to which only causation and not culpability was required 
to hold a party liable for damages.11 Strict liability effectively 
lightened claimants’ burden of proof relative to fault-based 
liability. The proliferation of hazardous activities with impacts that 
reached across international borders, and the concomitant risks of 
transboundary damage, brought the issue of liability to 
international law. The precedent of international legal liability was 
set by landmark cases such as the Trail Smelter dispute12 and the 
Corfu Channel case.13  As international legal liability arose in the 
context of hazardous activities posing disproportionately high 
cross-border environmental risks, subsequent development of 
international mechanisms for assessing and resolving liability was 
concentrated on environmental topics.14 Some of the more 
prominent issue-areas include marine oil pollution, transboundary 
movements of hazardous waste, nuclear accidents, Antarctic 
environmental protection, and biosafety related to living modified 
organisms.15 Strict liability, requiring no need to establish fault, 
emerged as the accepted standard in international law, for several 
important reasons: it avoided the difficult task of defining 
standards of care; it lessened the burden of proof for plaintiffs in 
complex, technical fields; and most of the activities initially 
covered were viewed as ultrahazardous.16 Since any system of 
 
 11  See id. at 67–69. 
 12  Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941). 
 13  Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9). 
 14  See Survey on Liability Regimes, supra note 7, at 65. 
 15  See Table 1 for an overview of selected international liability and 
compensation regimes. 
 16  See RUDIGER WOLFRUM & CHRISTINE LANGENFELD, ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION BY MEANS OF INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY LAW 398 (1999); A.E. 
Boyle, Globalising Environmental Liability: The Interplay of National and 
International Law, 17 J. ENVTL. L. 3, 13 (2005). 
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liability rests on a means of establishing causation, in those issue-
areas where demonstrating causal relationships has proven 
especially problematic, such as climate change, liability 
mechanisms have played little role.17 
Table 1: Selected International Liability and Compensation Regimes 
Regime Instrument Date of 
Adoption 
Date of 
Entry into 
Force 
Number 
of States Notes 
Aircraft 
accidents 
Convention on 
Damage Caused by 
Foreign Aircraft to 
Third Parties on the 
Surface (Rome 
Convention) 
10/7/52 4/1/68 49 
Compulsory 
insurance/ 
financial 
security 
 
Nuclear 
accidents 
Convention on Third 
Party Liability in the 
Field of Nuclear 
Energy (Paris 
Convention) 
7/29/60 4/1/68 15 
Multiple 
compensation 
tiers 
Vienna Convention on 
Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage 
5/1/63 11/12/77 38 
Supplementary 
Convention to the 
Convention on Third 
Party Liability in the 
Field of Nuclear 
Energy 
1/31/63 12/4/74 12 
  
 
 17  See Jutta Brunnée et al., Overview of Legal Issues Relevant to Climate 
Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY: TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 
23, 33–34 (Richard Lord et al. eds., 2012) (discussing problems related to 
climate change, causation, and liability). 
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Oil 
spills 
International 
Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage 
(CLC 69) 
11/29/69 6/19/75 
35 (74 
denunciations 
linked to CLC 
92) 
Multilateral 
compensation 
funds partially 
financed by 
mandatory levies; 
compulsory 
insurance; 
flexible 
institutional 
structure; industry 
integration 
International 
Convention on the 
Establishment of an 
International Fund 
for Compensation of 
Oil Pollution 
Damage (1971 Fund 
Convention) 
12/18/71 10/16/78 
18 (59 
denunciations 
linked to 1992 
Fund 
Convention) 
International 
Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage 
(CLC 92) 
11/27/92 5/30/96 130 
International 
Convention on the 
Establishment of an 
International Fund 
for Compensation 
for Oil Pollution 
Damage (1992 Fund 
Convention) 
11/27/92 5/30/96 111 
Protocol of 2003 to 
the International 
Convention on the 
Establishment of an 
International Fund 
for Compensation 
for Oil Pollution 
Damage 
(Supplementary 
Fund Convention) 
5/16/03 3/3/05 29 
 
Space 
objects 
Convention on 
International 
Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space 
Objects (Space 
Liability 
Convention) 
11/29/71 9/1/72 88 Only state 
liability regime 
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Dangerous 
activities 
relating to the 
environment 
Convention on Civil 
Liability for Damage 
Resulting from Activities 
Dangerous to the 
Environment (Lugano 
Convention) 
6/21/93 Not in 
force 9 
Compensation 
for damage to 
environment per 
se 
Hazardous 
substances at 
sea 
International Convention 
on Liability and 
Compensation for Damage 
in Connection With the 
Carriage of Hazardous and 
Noxious Substances by Sea 
(HNS Convention) 
5/3/96 Not in 
force 8 
Modeled on oil 
spill regime 
Hazardous 
wastes 
Basel Protocol on Liability 
and Compensation for 
Damage Resulting from 
Transboundary Movements 
of Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Disposal 
12/10/99 Not in 
force 11 
Liability 
determined by 
transport phase 
Bunker oil 
pollution 
International Convention 
on Civil Liability for 
Bunker Oil Pollution 
Damage (Bunkers 
Convention) 
3/23/01 11/1/08 68 Modeled on 
CLC 69 
Antarctic 
Treaty System 
Annex VI to the Protocol 
on Environmental 
Protection to the Antarctic 
Treaty: Liability Arising 
from Environmental 
Emergencies 
6/14/05 Not in 
force 6 
Applies to public 
and private 
actors 
Biosafety 
Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur 
Supplementary Protocol on 
Liability and Redress to the 
Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety 
10/15/10 Not in 
force 9 
Nested within 
biodiversity 
regime 
Note: For instruments in force, “Number of States” refers to number of contracting parties. 
For instruments not in force, “Number of States” refers to number of ratifications and 
accessions. 
International liability regimes vary along multiple dimensions. 
One fundamental distinction is between civil and state liability 
regimes. Most transboundary hazardous activities that have been 
subjected to international liability rules have been commercial in 
nature, carried out by firms or other private entities.18 Most of 
these regimes, in turn, have been based on civil liability, in which 
private parties are held accountable for damages occurring beyond 
national borders. As in domestic law, international civil liability 
 
 18  For example, of the thirty-four multilateral instruments cited by the 
International Law Commission (ILC) in its comprehensive global survey of 
liability regimes, only one agreement (the Convention on International Liability 
for Damage Caused by Space Objects) is primarily non-commercial in character. 
See Survey on Liability Regimes, supra note 7, at 63–64. 
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frameworks are generally premised on the polluter pays principle 
(although the degree to which it is achieved in practice varies 
greatly). For example, the regime covering maritime bunker fuel 
pollution, the 2001 International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Bunker Oil Pollution Damage (Bunkers Convention), assigns 
liability for damages exclusively to shipowners.19 Similarly, the 
regime covering civilian nuclear accidents, based on the 1960 Paris 
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy20 and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for 
Nuclear Damage21, holds owners of nuclear installations legally 
liable for transboundary damages resulting from nuclear accidents. 
Assigning liability to private owners and operators under civil 
liability systems is referred to as “channeling.”22 Provision is 
typically made for joint and several liability in cases of multiple 
defendants.23 Under civil liability regimes, claims for 
compensation are adjudicated in domestic courts, with states 
agreeing to mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments—in 
this way, civil regimes ultimately rely on state action to function 
effectively. 
By contrast, under a state liability regime, sovereign states are 
held liable for damages or injuries occurring outside respective 
areas of national jurisdiction or control. State liability has been 
accepted and codified only for activities that are primarily non-
commercial in character. Indeed, the 1972 Convention on 
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects 
(Space Liability Convention)24 is the only instance of an 
 
 19  International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution 
Damage art. 3, Mar. 23, 2001, 973 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 20  Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 
29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251. 
 21  Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 
1063 U.N.T.S. 265. 
 22  See JULIO BARBOZA, THE ENVIRONMENT, RISK AND LIABILITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 32–33 (2010). 
 23  Under joint and several liability, a claimant may pursue all claims tied to 
multiple defendants against a single defendant. If damages are awarded, 
defendants must jointly arrange for compensation to the claimant. See WARREN 
FREEDMAN, JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY: ALLOCATION OF RISK AND 
APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES 3 (1987). 
 24  Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Space 
Liability Convention]. 
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international liability mechanism based entirely on state liability.25 
State liability differs from the related concept of state 
responsibility.26 State responsibility, on the one hand, is invoked 
when states fail to uphold their international legal obligations.27 If 
a state fails to exercise due diligence as required by international 
law, for example, then it is considered to be in breach of its legal 
commitments and thus responsible for any damages that ensue. 
State liability, on the other hand, arises when damages occur as a 
result of lawful activities undertaken by states.28 If a state exercises 
due diligence yet injurious consequences still result, that state may 
be liable for damages. Again, liability applies to situations in 
which lawful activity gives rise to collateral damages. Under state 
liability, disputes are resolved through negotiation, mediation, or 
arbitration.29 In a world of sovereign states, settlements reached 
using these processes are not legally enforceable. This defining 
feature of international relations means that settling damage claims 
under a system of state liability is ultimately a political rather than 
a legal issue. 
Parties, whether state or private, are typically excluded from 
liability under certain conditions. Defendants normally are 
exonerated in the event of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, or 
insurrection.30  Exemptions are provided where damage is due to 
natural phenomena of “exceptional, inevitable and irresistible 
character” (acts of God or force majeure).31 Exclusions are also 
granted where injuries are traceable to acts or omissions of a third 
party, or of the claimant.32 In addition, regimes provide 
exemptions for situations specific to particular issue-areas. For 
example, under the 1996 International Convention on Liability and 
Compensation for Damage in Connection With the Carriage of 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS Convention), 
shipowners are excluded from liability in cases where responsible 
 
 25  See WOLFRUM & LANGENFELD, supra note 16, at 411. 
 26  See Frans G. von der Dunk, Liability Versus Responsibility in Space Law: 
Misconception or Misconstruction?, PROCEEDINGS 34TH COLLOQUIUM ON L. 
OUTER SPACE 363, 363–65 (1991) (discussing the distinction between state 
liability and state responsibility). 
 27  See BARBOZA, supra note 22, at 21–22. 
 28  See id. 
 29  See Survey on Liability Regimes, supra note 7, at 109–10. 
 30  See id. at 93–95. 
 31  See id. 
 32  See id. at 94–95. 
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states or other parties fail in their duty to provide coastal lights and 
other navigational aids.33 In addition to such exonerations, 
international liability agreements also normally prescribe a statute 
of limitations to restrict claims to a defined period of time.34  
Importantly, international law does not provide exclusions in cases 
where defendants claim to have acted to prevent pre-existing 
harms; likewise, affirmative defenses based on this argument are 
not available in domestic legal settings.35 
Compensation for damages usually takes the form of 
monetary payments. International liability regimes award 
compensation for traditional harms such as loss of life, personal 
injury, loss of or damage to property, and economic loss.36 To 
prove economic loss, a claimant must make the case that future 
earnings would have materialized if not for the event in question.37 
Compensation for economic loss is available, for instance, for 
damages to fishing and tourism industries under the oil spill 
regime, founded on the 1971 International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation of Oil 
Pollution Damage (1971 Fund Convention).38 Many regimes also 
entail compensation for preventive measures as well as reasonable 
steps taken to reinstate the environment.39 The 1993 Convention 
on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous 
 
 33  International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in 
Connection With the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 
May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1406. 
 34  See Survey on Liability Regimes, supra note 7, at 111–14. 
 35  There is no exhaustive list of defenses to tort liability with which to 
demonstrate this. However, there is a widely accepted principle permitting an 
actor to cause injury to another, without the consent of the other, in order to 
prevent a different harm. This principle only applies in situations where (1) it is 
an emergency where the actor does not have the opportunity to obtain consent 
and (2) the actor has no reason to believe the other would decline consent. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892D (1979). The corollary principle is that 
an actor is liable in a situation where there was an opportunity for consent to be 
given regardless of the harm that might be prevented. See Mohr v. Williams, 104 
N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905) (finding civil liability for assault and battery where a 
surgeon had consent to operate only on the right ear, but during surgery instead 
operated on the left ear as it was in worse condition). 
 36  See Survey on Liability Regimes, supra note 7 at 98–100. 
 37  See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Hans Bernd-Schafer, The Core of Pure 
Economic Loss, 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 8, 8 (2007). 
 38  International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund 
for Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57 
[hereinafter 1971 Fund Convention]. 
 39  See Survey on Liability Regimes, supra note 7, 98–99. 
HORTON_READY_FOR_PRINTER5.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2015  11:16 AM 
236 N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Volume 22 
to the Environment (Lugano Convention) provides a rare example 
of compensation for damage to the environment per se, regardless 
of impacts on socioeconomic use.40 
The predominance of strict liability in international law has 
been matched by widespread limits on compensation for liable 
parties.41 Another common feature of international liability 
mechanisms is compulsory insurance schemes, which are intended 
to ensure that those found liable have resources sufficient to meet 
their compensatory obligations. Typically, signatory states that 
license, register, or issue permits to owners or operators must 
require such parties to maintain adequate insurance or other 
financial security as a condition of operation. Under terms of the 
1952 Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third 
Parties on the Surface (Rome Convention), for example, aircraft 
operators must carry insurance or provide other security adequate 
to cover damages resulting from liability.42 
Quantitative caps on defendant liability have led to the 
creation of additional tiers of compensation within some liability 
regimes in order to ensure full redress for victims. For instance, the 
1963 Supplementary Convention to the Convention on Third Party 
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy established three layers of 
compensation for nuclear accidents in Europe: a first tier provided 
by operators of nuclear installations, who are protected by limited 
liability; a second tier provided by states on whose territory 
compromised installations are located, again with a specified cap; 
and a third tier based on contributions to a compensation fund 
made by all contracting parties.43 
The best-known liability compensation funds are the 
International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Funds, 
established beginning with the 1971 Fund Convention.44 The IOPC 
Funds are financed by mandatory levies on public and private 
 
 40  Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities 
Dangerous to the Environment, June 21, 1993, E.T.S. No. 150. 
 41  See Survey on Liability Regimes, supra note 7, 105–07. 
 42  Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on 
the Surface, Oct. 7, 1952, 310 U.N.T.S. 181. 
 43  Supplementary Convention to the Convention on Third Party Liability in 
the Field of Nuclear Energy, Jan. 31, 1963, 1041 U.N.T.S. 374. 
 44  See, e.g., Jutta Brunnee, Of Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on 
International Liability Regimes as Tools for Environmental Protection, 53 INT’L 
& COMP. L.Q. 351, 357–58 (2004). 
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entities that import oil.45 The purpose of such funds is to serve as a 
supplementary compensatory backstop in cases where liability 
limits have been reached, insurance was not maintained, 
defendants are insolvent, or no parties qualify as liable.46 Fund 
contributions may be mandatory or voluntary, and may derive 
from public or private entities.47 
As this discussion makes clear, existing liability mechanisms 
are closely tailored to the specific needs and features of the issue-
areas they are designed to help manage. Every potentially 
hazardous transboundary activity is distinguished by a unique risk 
profile, characterized by a set of variably likely, variably severe 
possible impacts. While SAI remains at the conceptual stage of 
development, researchers have already devoted considerable 
attention to potential hazards associated with this climate 
engineering technique. The following Section takes stock of 
current knowledge about possible losses and damages connected to 
SAI, and points toward some institutional elements that might be 
particularly suited to a future stratospheric aerosol liability regime. 
II. POSSIBLE SAI DAMAGES, POSSIBLE LIABILITY SOLUTIONS 
SAI, like other forms of SRM, is intended to reflect away a 
small fraction of the sunlight reaching the planet, thereby reducing 
climate changes that would otherwise occur as a result of the 
accumulation of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
SAI would accomplish this by introducing aerosols to the 
stratosphere. Most research and analysis has focused on the use of 
sulfuric acid aerosols created by the injection of sulfur dioxide.48 
Researchers have identified a number of significant damages 
that could potentially result from large-scale SAI experimentation 
and/or deployment. These harms fall into three distinct 
categories.49 First, there are a handful of risks directly related to the 
specific technology employed to carry out SAI. These risks pertain 
primarily to the unintended chemical effects of aerosols introduced 
 
 45  See INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS, THE INTERNATIONAL 
REGIME FOR COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: EXPLANATORY NOTE, 
4–7 (2014). 
 46  See id. at 3. 
 47  See id. at 4. 
 48  See, e.g., SOLAR RADIATION MGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, SOLAR 
RADIATION MANAGEMENT: THE GOVERNANCE OF RESEARCH 14–15 (2011). 
 49  See Table 2. 
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into the stratosphere. The use of sulfate aerosols in particular 
would lead to an increase in acid rain (although the small 
quantities and distributed delivery of sulfur typically proposed 
would be likely to substantially reduce the magnitude of this 
harm).50 And recovery of the stratospheric ozone layer might be 
slowed as a result of aerosol injection, as aerosols can shift 
chlorine from inactive reservoir species to the species that 
catalytically destroy ozone.51 Any ozone effects would likely be 
concentrated at the poles.52 In both of these cases, SAI technology 
carries the risk of independently intensifying existing 
environmental problems. Other, previously unidentified health, 
safety, or environmental risks might also materialize in the course 
of SAI operations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 50  See B. Kravitz et al., Sulfuric Acid Deposition from Stratospheric 
Geoengineering With Sulfate Aerosols, 114 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES.-ATMOSPHERES 
D14109 (2009). 
 51  See S. Tilmes et al., The Sensitivity of Polar Ozone Depletion to Proposed 
Geoengineering Schemes, 320 SCIENCE 1201, 1201 (2008). 
 52  See id. 
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Table 2: Possible Harms Associated with SAI 
Harm Category SAI Impact Probability Magnitude 
 
Technology 
risks 
Increased acid 
rain 
Certain Very low 
Increased ozone 
depletion, UV 
radiation (polar 
regions) 
High Low 
 
 
 
Climate 
response 
damages 
Uneven regional 
climate effects 
(temperature 
and 
precipitation) 
Certain Unknown, 
potentially 
high 
Disruptions to 
Asian, African 
monsoons 
Unknown High 
Reduced soil 
moisture in 
tropics 
Medium Unknown, 
potentially 
high 
Enhanced ocean 
acidification 
(due to reduced 
sea surface 
temperature) 
Low Low 
Reduced 
effectiveness of 
solar power 
generation 
Medium Low 
Whiter skies, 
altered sunsets 
High Unknown 
(aesthetic) 
Opportunity 
costs 
Loss of potential 
climate change 
benefits 
Varies Varies 
 
The second category of impacts arises from climate responses 
to SAI. The potential magnitude of climate response damages is 
typically larger than what characterizes more limited technology 
risks. To begin with, global climate change will produce a specific 
regional distribution of climate changes with largely negative 
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impacts.53 Current modeling studies suggest that injecting an 
artificial layer of aerosols into the stratosphere on top of projected 
climate change would reduce negative impacts of climate change 
overall. On average, the evidence available to date indicates that 
local weather patterns across the planet would more closely 
resemble preindustrial conditions if a globally warmer world 
implemented SAI than if no SAI were deployed—in this sense, 
global net utility would be higher with SAI than without. But SAI 
is also expected to redistribute some negative climate effects 
locally. As a consequence, a minority of regions might suffer 
greater losses in a climate-changed, geoengineered world than they 
would in a climate-changed world where geoengineering was not 
implemented.54 
At a planetary level, implementing SAI could cause 
exaggerated cooling in the tropics and amplified warming at high 
latitudes relative to preindustrial conditions.55 Modeling indicates 
that some regional precipitation patterns could shift.56 If 
stratospheric aerosols were used to completely offset the increase 
 
 53  See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Technical 
Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND 
VULNERABILITY 2 (Field, C.B., et al., eds., 2014), available at http://www.ipcc.c 
h/report/ar5/wg2/ (summarizing likely regional impacts of global climate 
change). 
 54  See K. Caldeira & L. Wood, Global and Arctic Climate Engineering: 
Numerical Model Studies, 366 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 4039, 4042 
(2008) (demonstrating that a minority of regions would suffer increased 
disruption due to precipitation changes under SRM compared to no SRM); H.D. 
Matthews & K. Caldeira, Transient Climate-Carbon Simulations of Planetary 
Geoengineering, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 9949, 9950 (2007) 
(demonstrating that a minority of regions would suffer increased disruption due 
to precipitation changes under SRM compared to no SRM); J. Pongratz et al., 
Crop Yields in a Geoengineered Climate, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 101, 103 
(2012) (demonstrating that individual local areas may exhibit larger changes in 
agricultural yields under SRM compared to no SRM); K.L. Ricke et al., Regional 
Climate Response to Solar Radiation Management, 3 NATURE GEOSCIENCES 537, 
537 (2010) (showing that in most regions and seasons SRM reduces disruptions 
due to precipitation changes compared to no SRM); H. Schmidt et al., Solar 
Irradiance Reduction to Counteract Radiative Forcing from a Quadrupling of 
CO2: Climate Responses Simulated by Four Earth System Models, 3 EARTH SYS. 
DYNAMICS 63, 74 (2012) (showing differentiated regional responses to SRM). 
 55  See B. Kravitz et al., Climate Model Response from the Geoengineering 
Model Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP), 118 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES.: 
ATMOSPHERES 8320, 8323 (2013); H. Schmidt et al., supra note 54, at 72. 
 56  See Simone Tilmes et al., The Hydrological Impact of Geoengineering in 
the Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP), 118 J. 
GEOPHYSICAL RES.: ATMOSPHERES 11,036, 11,036 (2013). 
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in global mean temperature caused by anthropogenic CO2, then 
global average precipitation would be reduced (relative to the 
projected increase from a warming world).57 (Modeling also 
indicates that changes in regional precipitation would be even 
greater in a warmer world without SRM.58) Particular concerns 
have been raised over possible disruptions to Asian and African 
monsoon systems.59 (But again, current modeling indicates that 
monsoon disruptions would be more severe in a warmer world 
without SRM.60) In addition, evidence suggests that soil moisture 
levels in the tropics could be reduced.61 
The use of stratospheric aerosols poses other climate response 
risks distinct from uneven regional climate effects. Ocean 
acidification is already occurring as a result of excess atmospheric 
CO2, but could be additionally enhanced by SAI as lower sea 
surface temperatures promote increased oceanic uptake of CO2 
(although net effects on ocean pH would likely be negligible).62 
Researchers have speculated that solar power generation might be 
negatively affected due to changes in light quality.63 Lastly, 
research indicates that SAI would likely result in whiter skies and 
more colorful sunsets.64 As in the case of possible damages 
resulting directly from SAI operations, other, unanticipated climate 
responses to stratospheric aerosol interventions may lead to 
significant unforeseen losses. 
 
 57  See id. at 11,044–47. 
 58  See id. at 11,050. 
 59  See Alan Robock et al., Regional Climate Responses to Geoengineering 
with Tropical and Arctic SO2 Injections, 113 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. D16101, 
D16101 (2008). But see Juan B. Moreno-Cruz et al., A Simple Model to Account 
for Regional Inequalities in the Effectiveness of Solar Radiation Management, 
110 CLIMATIC CHANGE 649, 661 (2012). 
 60  See Tilmes et al., supra note 56, at 11,047–53. 
 61  See G. Bala et al., Albedo Enhancement of Marine Clouds to Counteract 
Global Warming: Impacts on Hydrological Cycle, 37 CLIMATE DYNAMICS 915, 
921 (2011).  
 62  H. Damon Matthews et al., Sensitivity of Ocean Acidification to 
Geoengineered Climate Stabilization, 36 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L10706 
(2009); Phillip Williamson & Carol Turley, Ocean Acidification in a 
Geoengineering Context, 370 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 4317, 4317 
(2012). 
 63  Daniel M. Murphy, Effect of Stratospheric Aerosols on Direct Sunlight 
and Implications for Concentrating Solar Power, 43 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 2784, 
2784 (2009). 
 64  Ben Kravitz et al., Geoengineering: Whiter Skies?, 39 GEOPHYSICAL RES. 
LETTERS L11801 (2012). 
HORTON_READY_FOR_PRINTER5.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2015  11:16 AM 
242 N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Volume 22 
A third category of potential harms includes opportunity costs 
stemming from climate change benefits that do not occur because 
of SAI deployment. Opportunity costs, in this sense, are equivalent 
to economic losses caused by economic opportunities foreclosed. 
For example, successful SAI deployment would be expected to 
reduce, halt, or even reverse the regional thawing currently 
underway in the Arctic. Yet a multiplicity of actors has already 
invested in expanded oil and gas exploration opportunities made 
possible by climate change above the Arctic Circle.65 Arresting the 
Arctic thaw would both diminish the value of investments made to 
date in regional hydrocarbon extraction, and cut off the expected 
future revenue streams on which such investments are based. 
Expanded Arctic shipping and improved agricultural productivity 
in boreal zones represent other potential opportunity costs of SAI, 
since solar geoengineering would counteract the warming on 
which these activities depend. The probability and magnitude of 
harms resulting from lost benefits of climate change would vary 
widely depending on the potential benefit in question. 
The risks described above are characterized by different 
degrees of likelihood, different orders of severity, and, above all, 
high levels of uncertainty. The probability, magnitude, and 
location of potential harms are likely to vary in unpredictable ways 
based on the rate, size, and point of intervention. These risks could 
be at least partially mitigated through wise choices about, for 
example, temperature targets, spatial distribution, particle type, 
quantity, and rate of release. However, the possibility of such 
losses likely cannot be completely eliminated, and would need to 
be addressed by any prospective SAI liability mechanism. 
Furthermore, the threat of “unknown unknowns” would 
accompany any SAI implementation; since these cannot be 
anticipated prior to deployment, a post-factum liability system 
would be the only way to manage risks of this type. 
From the perspective of liability and compensation, two 
aspects of these potential hazards stand out. First is the potentially 
high magnitude of damages that attend several of these known 
risks (regardless of the probability of their occurring). In 
particular, regional threats to the hydrological cycle, whether in the 
form of localized flooding or droughts, interference with 
 
 65  See, e.g., Scott Borgerson, The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice Melts, the 
Region Heats Up, 92 FOREIGN AFF. 76, 80 (2013). 
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monsoons, or reduced soil moisture, constitute a significant 
potential source of loss caused by SAI implementation. Large-
scale disruptions to water supplies and agriculture could pose 
serious risks to sizeable populations. We make the working 
assumption that the damages from SAI—for the worst affected 
regions—would be of the same order of magnitude as damages 
expected from climate change.66 In this case, total SAI damages 
could amount to roughly one percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP). This would equate to monetary damages of approximately 
$10 billion for a country the size of Indonesia, or $100 billion for a 
country the size of China. All things being equal, larger 
interventions would likely cause more severe damages and hence 
larger liabilities. A well-structured, all-inclusive international 
liability mechanism designed to ascertain damage, allocate loss, 
and award compensation for hydrological and other possible 
hazards might well be a precondition for any widespread, 
multilateral political decision to move forward with stratospheric 
aerosol deployment. 
Second, as is often the case in international relations, a North-
South political dynamic infuses many of these hazards, particularly 
those that are potentially most severe, such as hydrological 
disruptions. Within the emerging discourse on geoengineering, one 
dominant strain holds that climate interventions such as SAI 
represent a political project of the global North. According to this 
view, the benefits of climate engineering would accrue 
disproportionately to the developed world, while the costs would 
fall primarily on developing countries.67 The opposing view seems 
more credible as climate risks are well known to be more severe in 
the global South because there is less adaptive capacity.68 
 
 66  The following calculations are made based on the approximately one 
percent GDP climate damage estimate used by the Dynamic Integrated Climate-
Economy (DICE) model and the IPCC, and current national GDP estimates 
provided by the World Bank. See WILLIAM NORDHAUS & PAUL SZTORC, DICE 
2013R: INTRODUCTION AND USER’S MANUAL 11–12 (2d ed. 2013) (indicating 
one percent GDP estimate). 
 67  See, e.g., ETC GROUP, GEOPIRACY: THE CASE AGAINST GEOENGINEERING 
3 (2010), available at http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/ 
publication/pdf_file/ETC_geopiracy_4web.pdf. 
 68  See, e.g., Climate Change Secretariat of the U.N. Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and 
Adaptation in Developing Countries 5 (2007) (noting that “[d]eveloping 
countries are the most vulnerable to climate change impacts because they have 
fewer resources to adapt: socially, technologically and financially”). 
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Nevertheless, a narrative of exploitation has gained traction.69 As 
with climate change more broadly, SRM and its possible effects 
have become inextricably linked to ongoing arguments about 
Northern responsibility, Southern victimhood, rights to develop, 
and climate justice,70 and a successful liability mechanism must 
take these political realities into account. 
With these characteristics in mind, how do possible hazards 
associated with SAI map onto the historical development of 
liability and compensation at the international level? As a starting 
point, it is necessary to recognize that strict liability (as opposed to 
fault-based) has become the standard in international law, and 
would almost certainly apply to any SAI liability regime.71 The 
reasons for this are both practical and political. Once established, 
norms such as strict liability in international law are very difficult 
to dislodge.72 Some risks from SAI and other forms of SRM, such 
as changes in regional precipitation patterns, are potentially very 
costly, for which strict, no-fault liability is regarded as appropriate. 
Demonstrating fault is notoriously problematic in international 
legal proceedings.73 And the standard of strict liability eases the 
burden of proof for claimants, a condition that would almost 
certainly be insisted upon by any major power uninvolved in the 
deployment of SRM. 
The purpose of SAI, as discussed, would be to counteract 
some of the potential damages stemming from climate change. It 
might be argued that this preventative character makes harms 
 
 69  See Jonas Anshelm & Anders Hansson, Battling Promethean Dreams and 
Trojan Horses: Revealing the Critical Discourses of Geoengineering, 2 ENERGY 
RES. & SOC. SCI. 135, 142 (2014). 
 70  See, e.g., AFRICAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND THE SOLAR RADIATION 
MANAGEMENT GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, GOVERNANCE OF RESEARCH ON 
SOLAR GEOENGINEERING: AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES 20–27 (2013); Mulugeta M. 
Ayalew & Florent Gasc, Managing Climate Risks in Africa: The Role of 
Geoengineering, GEOENGINEERING OUR CLIMATE?, July 2013, available at 
http://geoengineeringourclimate.com/2013/07/23/managing-climate-risks-in-
africa-the-role-of-geoengineering-opinion-article/.  
 71  It is conceivable that, depending on institutional arrangements, strict 
liability for SAI geoengineering could create such powerful disincentives for 
individual states to carry out deployment that SAI would not be provided, even if 
there is universal agreement on its desirability. Such a free rider problem 
theoretically could be overcome by enhancing the scope and credibility of 
exemptions from liability. 
 72  See ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
310–12 (1999). 
 73  See Boyle, supra note 16, at 13. 
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caused by solar geoengineering ethically distinct from more 
conventional harms, and hence SAI liability claims ought to be 
restricted in their admissibility if not disallowed in their entirety. 
As noted above, however, no legal precedent exists for negating 
liability on this basis, and it is extremely unlikely that such a 
defense would be accepted in practice.74 
Beyond these points, institutional and conceptual 
developments in the field of international legal liability lead to 
three distinct conclusions when viewed through the lens of 
stratospheric aerosol geoengineering. First, the manner in which 
SAI would likely be conducted suggests that state, rather than 
civil, liability is the appropriate basis on which to construct a 
liability regime. Second, the potentially enormous costs that might 
result from certain negative impacts (however unlikely they may 
be) recommend use of a compensation fund to spread the burden 
of compensation as well as to reassure potential victims that 
reparations will be paid. Third, and most challenging, the necessity 
of being able to establish causation in any liability regime (whether 
strict or fault-based), combined with the difficulty of 
demonstrating causality with respect to any climate intervention, 
warrants a fresh look at issues of legal causation in the climate 
context. The next Sections address these three topics in turn. 
III. STATE LIABILITY AND THE SPACE LIABILITY CONVENTION 
As noted earlier, a key question for the design of any liability 
regime is whether the activity in question is commercial or non-
commercial in nature. In general, commercial transboundary 
hazardous activities have been subject to civil liability regimes, 
while state liability has been assigned to activities where markets 
play little role.75 SRM, including its stratospheric aerosol variant, 
would likely constitute an archetypal public activity, for which a 
regime of state liability would be appropriate. Atmospheric 
manipulation via stratospheric aerosol injection would act upon the 
quintessential global commons. There is no current market for 
SRM, and few incentives exist for private firms to engage in solar 
geoengineering without strong (inter)governmental leadership. 
Indeed, the very liability risks discussed in the preceding Section 
would serve as powerful and probably insurmountable obstacles to 
 
 74  See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 75  See Survey on Liability Regimes, supra note 7, at 107. 
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organizing SRM as a primarily commercial enterprise, even if 
there were a market for it, since adequate insurance likely would 
be impossible for corporations to obtain. 
Even if SAI could be successfully commercialized, a 
privatized system of stratospheric SRM would probably be 
politically unacceptable. The notion of commercial or corporate 
control over SRM is highly controversial and subject to intense 
debate within the geoengineering community.76 While many 
potential stakeholders are open to the possibility of corporate 
participation in SAI, for example, as contractors or vendors,77 little 
(if any) support has been voiced for operational decision making 
by private, commercial entities. Even those interests most 
sympathetic toward market solutions to public policy problems, 
who advocate at least a partial substitution of SRM in place of 
emissions mitigation, view states as the essential players in any 
organized stratospheric aerosol effort.78 For political, practical, and 
principled reasons, therefore, it is necessary to approach SAI as a 
non-commercial endeavor best suited to a system of state liability. 
The only liability regime based solely on state liability, as 
noted above, is the Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects, also known as the Space 
Liability Convention, which was both signed and entered into 
force in 1972.79 This convention was in effect an elaboration of the 
principle of state liability for damages in outer space as set down 
in the foundational 1967 Outer Space Treaty.80 Specifically, 
according to Article VII of the Treaty: 
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the 
launching of an object into outer space, including the moon and 
other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory 
 
 76  See, e.g., KELSI BRACMORT & RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R41371, GEOENGINEERING: GOVERNANCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 5 
(2013); THE ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 1, at 5. 
 77  See Steve Rayner et al., The Oxford Principles 26–27 (Climate 
Geoengineering Governance, Working Paper No. 1, 2013). 
 78  E.g., James Erick Bickel & Lee Lane, Challenge Paper: Climate Change, 
Climate Engineering R&D, Copenhagen Consensus 2012, available at 
http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/Climate%2BChange%2
BEngineering%2BR%2526D.pdf (advocating a government-run SRM research 
and development program). 
 79  Space Liability Convention, supra note 24. 
 80  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. 
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or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for 
damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or 
juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the 
Earth, in airspace or in outer space, including the moon and 
other celestial bodies.81 
The institutional machinery for actualizing state liability in 
outer space was spelled out five years later in the Space Liability 
Convention. 
The Convention was intended to facilitate the launching of 
spacecraft, satellites, and other “space objects” into outer space for 
purposes of exploration and responsible use, while at the same 
time protecting the interests of those who might be negatively 
affected by accidental impacts or collisions caused by those space 
objects.82 Only states may present and answer claims for 
compensation.83 Private parties, either victims or accused, must be 
represented by national governments.84 Where more than one state 
is involved in a space launch, the Convention provides for joint 
and several liability.85 Exoneration is available in cases of 
contributory negligence on the part of victim states.86 
The Space Liability Convention lays out a two-stage claims 
procedure for settling disputes over damage from space objects. 
The first step requires the claimant state(s) to present its claim to 
the alleged launching state(s), and for the parties to attempt to 
reach a settlement through “diplomatic channels.”87 In the event a 
mutually acceptable settlement cannot be reached, the Convention 
provides for the convening of a three-person “Claims 
 
 81  Id. art. VII. 
 82  Space Liability Convention, supra note 24, pmbl. 
 83  Id. art. IX. 
 84  Id. art. VIII. 
 85  Id. art. V. 
 86  The Convention remains exceptional in that it establishes two separate 
standards of liability based upon where damage occurs. For impacts on the 
surface of the Earth and collisions with aircraft, strict (“absolute”) liability was 
assigned to “launching states.” But for collisions in orbit and otherwise above the 
atmosphere, fault liability was assigned to responsible launching states. Fault-
based liability in cases of space object collision in outer space was premised on 
the idea that only major “space powers” would be likely to suffer such damage, 
these powers were of equivalent stature, and launching states were fully 
cognizant of the risks entailed in placing satellites and other objects into outer 
space. See BRUCE A. HURWITZ, STATE LIABILITY FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 1972 CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR 
DAMAGE CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS 34 (1992). 
 87  Space Liability Convention, supra note 24, art. IX. 
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Commission,” composed of one individual appointed by each side 
as well as a third member jointly agreed upon.88 Decisions of the 
Claims Commission “shall be final and binding if the parties have 
so agreed; otherwise the Commission shall render a final and 
recommendatory award, which the parties shall consider in good 
faith.”89 Compensation for damage should aim “to provide such 
reparation . . . as will restore the person, natural or juridical, State 
or international organization on whose behalf the claim is 
presented to the condition which would have existed if the damage 
had not occurred” (i.e., status quo ante).90 There is no limit to 
liability or cap on compensation.91 The entire claims process can 
take no more than four years to complete.92 
To date, the Convention has been invoked only once.93 In 
1978, Cosmos 954, a Soviet nuclear-powered satellite, 
malfunctioned and fell from orbit, scattering approximately one 
hundred kilograms of largely radioactive debris over a broad 
swathe of northern Canada.94 Due to the remoteness of the 
deposition area, the small amount of debris, and the short half-lives 
of radioactive materials involved, the crash was determined to pose 
no significant hazards to people or the environment.95 Recovery 
and analysis of the debris, however, cost the Canadian government 
approximately CAD$14 million.96 
In January 1979, the Canadian government presented a 
surface-based strict liability claim to the Soviet Union for damages 
stemming from the Cosmos 954 incident, grounded in the Space 
Liability Convention, to which both states were party.97 
Specifically, Canada requested approximately CAD$6 million in 
compensation for the “incremental costs” incurred in the course of 
search, recovery, technical analysis, and storage activities related 
 
 88  Id. art. XIV–XV. 
 89  Id. art. XIX, ¶ 2. 
 90  Id. art. XII. 
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. art. X. 
 93  See SANDS ET AL., supra note 9, at 728. 
 94  See GOV’T OF CAN., DEP’T OF EXTERNAL AFF., NOTE FROM THE 
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, 23 
JANUARY 1979; ANNEX A: STATEMENT OF CLAIM 924 (1979). 
 95  See W.K. GUMMER ET AL., CAN. ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL BD., COSMOS 
954: THE OCCURRENCE AND NATURE OF RECOVERED DEBRIS 33–35 (1980). 
 96  Id. at 36. 
 97  GOV’T OF CAN., supra note 94 at 899. 
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to debris from Cosmos 954.98 (Canada did not seek the additional 
CAD$8 million incurred in the cleanup because the Soviets had 
signaled their refusal to pay for “fixed costs” such as 
administrative expenditures, which in their view were not properly 
recoverable.99) Canada’s claim was presented in accordance with 
the first, negotiation stage of the claims procedure laid out by the 
Convention. A series of bilateral negotiating sessions (notably 
conducted against the politically charged background of the 1979 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) ended in April 1981 with an 
agreement by the Soviets to pay CAD$3 million to the Canadian 
government for damages caused by the disintegration of Cosmos 
954, a sum accepted in full and without qualification by Canada.100 
Indeed, in the context of contemporary Cold War relations, many 
Western observers were pleasantly surprised by how much the 
Soviets were willing to pay.101 Many legal scholars and other 
observers regarded the Cosmos 954 settlement as a success for the 
Convention.102 However, the fact that Canada, a developed country 
and close ally of the United States, ultimately received less than a 
quarter of the amount originally spent on cleanup, even though the 
source of the damage was unambiguous, also supports an 
interpretation of the incident as a case where liability payments 
were insufficient. 
Several modest yet important insights derive from 
consideration of the Space Liability Convention and its application 
in the case of Cosmos 954. First and most simply, the existence of 
an operative state-based international liability mechanism for 
damage caused by space objects shows that many of the structures 
that would be needed for a SAI liability regime, in particular a 
state-based standard, are possible. To be sure, the harms 
potentially caused by SAI could dwarf those associated with 
incidents such as Cosmos 954. In current U.S. dollars, the Cosmos 
954 settlement was approximately $6 million, compared to the 
$10–$100 billion SAI damage estimate noted above. Second, the 
Cosmos 954 incident demonstrates that a state-based mechanism is 
in fact workable. After incurring cleanup costs associated with 
 
 98  See HURWITZ, supra note 86, at 118. 
 99  See Alexander F. Cohen, Cosmos 954 and the International Law of 
Satellite Accidents, 10 YALE J. INT’L L. 78, 85–86 (1984). 
 100  See HURWITZ, supra note 86, at 125. 
 101  See Cohen, supra note 99, at 87–89. 
 102  See, e.g., HURWITZ, supra note 86, at 128–29. 
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radioactive debris from a foreign satellite, the Canadian 
government presented a claim for damages to its Soviet 
counterpart, and subsequent negotiations produced a settlement 
acceptable to both states. Of course, this episode represents only a 
single case under a single convention, and it would be wholly 
inappropriate to extrapolate wider lessons for other areas based on 
the specifics of the Cosmos 954 affair. Nevertheless, its occurrence 
and amicable resolution underline the practical potential of liability 
regimes built on sovereign state claimants and defendants. 
Third, legal scholars regard the Space Liability Convention as 
a well-designed, effective instrument with features worthy of 
emulation by other regimes. Hurwitz, for example, concludes that 
“The Liability Convention . . . provides a solid basis for the 
creation of new liability regimes. [T]he Convention is an effective 
and useful instrument for the development of international 
law . . . .”103 Lastly, some singular aspects of the Convention may 
be especially significant for issues related to SAI liability. In 
particular, the role of “launching states” as potentially liable 
parties under the Convention may serve as a helpful analog for 
states which in the future might deliver stratospheric aerosols or 
precursor gases, providing important conceptual, definitional, and 
legal foundations for a system of liability and compensation 
focused on SAI deployment. 
IV. COMPENSATION AND THE OIL SPILL REGIME 
Given a rough estimate of $10–$100 billion in possible 
damages resulting from SAI deployment, any politically 
acceptable SAI liability regime would need to have the capacity (if 
not the resources) to provide indemnification on this scale to 
affected parties. The most developed and highly capitalized system 
for international compensation is found in the liability provisions 
and industry funds that together make up the international oil spill 
regime.104 The origin and evolution of the oil spill regime offers 
many lessons potentially applicable to a future liability regime for 
stratospheric aerosols. 
Accidental oil pollution at sea, or oil spills, became an urgent 
 
 103  Id. at 209. 
 104  See, e.g., Anne Daniel, Civil Liability Regimes as a Complement to 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Sound International Policy or False 
Comfort?, 12 RECIEL 225, 227 (2003). 
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international issue with the advent of the supertanker in the 
1960s.105 The rapidly expanding scale of potential spills, combined 
with the highly complex, transnational nature of shipping oil by 
sea (with shipowners, operators, insurers, cargo owners, charterers, 
and other interests based in different countries and subject to 
multiple jurisdictions exercised by flag states, coastal states, and 
port states), created powerful incentives for systematizing and 
rationalizing a uniform approach to settling disputes and 
compensating for damages.106 The need for such a regime was 
brought home in dramatic fashion by the 1967 wreck of the Torrey 
Canyon just outside British territorial waters. The tanker was 
owned by a Bermudan company and registered in Liberia, had 
been chartered by U.S. oil major Unocal then sub-chartered to 
British Petroleum, and the 32 million gallons of crude oil it spilled 
fouled coastlines in Britain as well as France.107 The ensuing legal 
morass (eventually settled108) convinced governments and industry 
that a more orderly system was required. 
Diplomatic conferences quickly produced a pair of linked 
conventions that spread the burden of compensation between 
shipowners and oil companies. The first of these was the 1969 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage.109 CLC 69, as it is known, assigned primary liability for 
oil spills to the shipping industry.110 The treaty was based on strict, 
no-fault liability, and executed through the civil courts of 
contracting parties.111 Liability was channeled to tanker owners, 
who were required to compensate governments and private parties 
alike for losses stemming from “pollution damage” (including 
preventive measures) affecting coastlines and territorial seas.112 
 
 105  See Samuel Bergman, No Fault Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 5 J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 1, 5–6 (1973). 
 106  See ALAN KHEE-JIN TAN, VESSEL-SOURCE MARINE POLLUTION: THE LAW 
AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 288–89 (2006). 
 107  See COLIN DE LA RUE & CHARLES B. ANDERSON, SHIPPING AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT: LAW AND PRACTICE 11 (2d ed. 2009). 
 108  See Patrick Griggs, “Torrey Canyon,” 45 Years On: Have We Solved All 
the Problems?, in POLLUTION AT SEA: LAW AND LIABILITY 3, 5 (Baris Soyer & 
Andrew Tettenborn eds., 2012). 
 109  International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 
Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CLC 69]. 
 110  Id. art. III. 
 111  Id. 
 112  Id. art. II. 
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Owner liability was limited to a maximum 210 million francs 
Poincare (equivalent to approximately $3 million in 2014 
dollars113), although liability could be suspended under certain 
exculpatory circumstances such as acts of war.114 In order to 
ensure availability of adequate funds, shipowners were required to 
carry compulsory insurance certificates issued by flag states and 
subject to inspection by all states party to the convention.115  
Claimants were entitled to take direct legal action against 
insurers.116 In all cases, a six-year statute of limitations applied to 
spill incidents.117 
Governments signed CLC 69 with the explicit understanding 
that it would be followed by a second convention affixing an 
additional layer of liability to the oil industry.118 This came at the 
insistence of tanker owners, marine insurance providers (so-called 
protection and indemnity insurance or “P&I Clubs”), and maritime 
states, who demanded that the burden of compensation for oil spill 
liability be shared by those who owned and profited from the oil in 
question.119 The 1971 Fund Convention fulfilled this demand by 
setting up a new fund (“Fund 71”) to pay for pollution damages in 
the event CLC 69 liability limits were reached (or victims 
otherwise went uncompensated).120 This second tier of 
compensation was financed by annual contributions from major oil 
companies.121 For any one incident, aggregate compensation paid 
by CLC 69 and Fund 71 together was capped at 450 million francs 
Poincare ($6 million).122 Fund 71 was structured as an 
intergovernmental organization complete with a voting Assembly 
 
 113  Calculated by the authors using historical exchange rate and contemporary 
inflation calculators. 
 114  The franc Poincare (similar to the French franc) was formerly the standard 
unit of account used in international liability instruments, but has since been 
replaced by the International Monetary Fund special drawing right. U.S. dollar 
equivalents for both francs Poincare and special drawing rights provided 
subsequently in the text are approximations in 2014 dollars. See generally 
JOSEPH GOLD, SDRS, CURRENCIES, AND GOLD: SEVENTH SURVEY OF NEW LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENTS (1987) (discussing francs Poincare and special drawing rights). 
 115  CLC 69, supra note 109, art. VII. 
 116  Id. 
 117  Id. art. VIII. 
 118  See DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 107, at 17. 
 119  See TAN, supra note 106, at 295. 
 120  1971 Fund Convention, supra note 38. 
 121  Id. art. X. 
 122  Id. art IV. 
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and international Secretariat.123 
CLC 69 entered into force in 1975 and the 1971 Fund 
Convention in 1978.124 In order to fill the regulatory void during 
the ratification process, and to stave off more aggressive unilateral 
actions by coastal states, the oil majors led in the creation of two 
voluntary industry arrangements designed to serve as interim 
liability measures.125 The Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement 
Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP) provided for 
shipowner liability in much the same way as CLC 69, while the 
Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for 
Oil Pollution (CRISTAL) assigned secondary liability to oil 
company cargo owners using a mechanism similar to Fund 71.126 
Tanker owners that joined TOVALOP gained access to 
inexpensive insurance and advantageous claims settlement 
procedures,127 and oil companies that joined CRISTAL benefited 
from its affiliated fund that assumed member liabilities exceeding 
specified ceilings.128 TOVALOP took effect in 1969 and 
CRISTAL in 1971.129 
Even as these industry initiatives became operative, followed 
by CLC 69 and Fund 71, a series of devastating incidents, notably 
the 1978 Amoco Cadiz130 and 1980 Tanio131 spills off France, 
exposed the inadequacy of existing liability limits to cover the full 
range of losses resulting from major spills. For this and other 
reasons, the United States refused to ratify either CLC 69 or the 
1971 Fund Convention, leaving the world’s leading oil importer 
outside the emerging international regulatory framework.132 To 
address these problems, contracting parties drafted two protocols 
 
 123  Id. art. XVI. 
 124  See TAN, supra note 106, at 309. 
 125  See id. at 291. 
 126  See DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 107, at 13–14, 17. 
 127  See R. MICHAEL M’GONIGLE & MARK W. ZACHER, POLLUTION, POLITICS, 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: TANKERS AT SEA 159 (1981); Michael Faure & Wang 
Hui, The International Regimes for the Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage: 
Are They Effective?, 12 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT’L L. 242, 245 (2003). 
 128  See Susan Bloodworth, Death on the High Seas: The Demise of 
TOVALOP and CRISTAL, 13 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 443, 446–48 (1998). 
 129  See TAN, supra note 106, at 292, 301. 
 130  See id. at 311. 
 131  See id. at 312. 
 132  See id. at 318–19. 
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to the conventions in 1984.133 The first protocol revised shipowner 
liability upward. Ships less than 5,000 tons were liable up to 3 
million International Monetary Fund (IMF) special drawing rights 
(SDRs) ($7 million).134 For each additional ton beyond this, ships 
were liable for 420 SDRs, up to a maximum 59.7 million SDRs 
($140 million) per incident.135 The second protocol increased the 
maximum aggregate CLC 69 and Fund 71 compensation to 135 
million SDRs ($310 million), thereby expanding oil industry 
liability.136 
By the early 1990s, faced with continuing U.S. intransigence, 
states party to the conventions adopted two new agreements.137 
The 1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage (CLC 92)138 effectively superseded the original 
CLC 69 with the higher shipowner liabilities specified in the first 
1984 protocol. Similarly, the 1992 International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage (1992 Fund Convention)139 established a new 
Fund 92 in accordance with the higher financial limits laid out in 
the second 1984 protocol.140 The 1992 conventions came into force 
in 1996, and Fund 71 began winding up in 2002.141 Such episodes 
exemplify the sort of institutional flexibility that a liability regime 
 
 133  See id. at 313. 
 134  The SDR is a currency basket that serves as the unit of account for the 
IMF. See generally GOLD, supra note 114 (discussing special drawing rights). 
 135  See WANG HUI, CIVIL LIABILITY FOR MARINE OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: A 
COMPARATIVE AND ECONOMIC STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL, U.S. AND 
CHINESE COMPENSATION REGIME 140 (2011). 
 136  See id. 
 137  Before the 1984 protocols took effect, the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill 
occurred off Alaska, subsequently driving the U.S. Congress to pass the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA-90). This legislation instituted liability limits even 
higher than those envisioned by the 1984 protocols, with the result that the 
United States again refused to ratify CLC 69 and the 1971 Fund Convention. Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012). 
 138  International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 
Nov. 27, 1992, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CLC 92]. 
 139  International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund 
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 27, 1992, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter 1992 Fund Convention]. 
 140  Id. art IV. Both instruments extended coverage for oil spill damage to 
parties’ exclusive economic zones consistent with the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
 141  See TAN, supra note 106, at 329–30. 
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for SAI will likely require. TOVALOP and CRISTAL, having 
undergone multiple revisions over the years to keep pace with 
regulatory developments, were formally terminated in 1997.142 
By the turn of the century, new accidents such as the 1999 
Erika spill off France143 and the 2002 Prestige spill off Spain144 
made clear that even the enhanced 1992 compensation levels were 
insufficient to compensate for losses from oil spills. In response, 
contracting parties crafted another package of liability upgrades. In 
2000, governments amended CLC 92 so that ships are liable up to 
89,770,000 SDRs ($165 million) per incident.145 Likewise, the 
maximum aggregate compensation under the 1992 Fund 
Convention was raised to 203 million SDRs ($375 million).146 
These changes amounted to a two-thirds increase relative to 1992 
liability levels. Both amendments came into force in 2003.147 That 
same year, yet another instrument was signed, the 2003 
Supplementary Fund Convention.148 This optional protocol 
established a third tier Supplementary Fund for interested states, 
for whom the maximum aggregate compensation available from 
CLC 92 and Fund 92 (both as amended) together with the new 
Supplementary Fund (the “IOPC Funds”) would be 750 million 
SDRs ($1.3 billion).149 Additionally, to address concerns that 
liability burdens had become unbalanced to the detriment of the oil 
industry, the shipping industry consented to another set of 
voluntary agreements obliging P&I Clubs to partially indemnify 
the IOPC Funds.150 The Small Tanker Oil Pollution 
Indemnification Agreement (STOPIA) applied to Fund 92, while 
the Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnity Agreement (TOPIA) applied to 
 
 142  See Bloodworth, supra note 128, at 444. 
 143  See Luc Grellet, Avoiding International Legal Regimes: The Erika 
Experience, in POLLUTION AT SEA: LAW AND LIABILITY 141, 141 (Baris Soyer & 
Andrew Tettenborn eds., 2012). 
 144  See TAN, supra note 106, at 331. 
 145  CLC 92, supra note 138, art. V. 
 146  1992 Fund Convention, supra note 139, art. IV. 
 147  See INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION 
FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: TEXTS OF THE 1992 CIVIL LIABILITY CONVENTION, 
THE 1992 FUND CONVENTION AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY FUND PROTOCOL 3 
(2011). 
 148  Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of 
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992, May 
16, 2003, 973 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 149  See id. art. IV. 
 150  See HUI, supra note 135, at 182–83. 
HORTON_READY_FOR_PRINTER5.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2015  11:16 AM 
256 N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Volume 22 
the Supplementary Fund.151 Both shipping industry schemes took 
effect in 2006.152 
The history of the oil spill regime has been characterized 
overall by continually increasing liability limits; accreting layers of 
additional compensation; balancing of burdens between 
shipowners and oil interests; and supplementing intergovernmental 
arrangements with industry initiatives. This evolution has been 
driven to a large degree by a series of major oil spills beginning 
with the Torrey Canyon in 1967, but in terms of number of 
incidents, quantity spilt, and other key measures, there has been a 
remarkable decline in accidental oil spills since the 1960s: “the 
volume of oil spilt from tankers demonstrates a significant 
improvement through the decades. Consistent with the reduction in 
the number of oil spills from tankers, the volume of oil spilt also 
shows a marked reduction.”153 While large spills have been the 
impetus for institutional changes, their frequency and resulting 
damages have declined markedly over time. 
There are indications that compensation payments under the 
oil spill regime have had a “deterrent effect” by encouraging 
industry to take preventative safety measures.154 The regime is 
generally viewed as effective in providing satisfactory 
compensation to public and private victims of oil spills: “features 
such as strict liability, compulsory insurance, limitation funds, 
direct action against insurers and cargo-financed supplemental 
funds have all benefited pollution victims immensely.”155 In the 
vast majority of cases, claims for oil spill damages brought under 
the regime have been settled out of court.156 The most recent 
available data indicate that, since Fund 71 first became 
operational, the IOPC Funds collectively have distributed a total 
£569 million ($896 million) in compensation to the victims of 147 
 
 151  See DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 107, at 172–75 (describing 
STOPIA and TOPIA). 
 152  See HUI, supra note 135, at 183. 
 153  INT’L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N LTD., OIL TANKER SPILL 
STATISTICS 2012 6 (2013). 
 154  See Michael Faure & Wang Hui, Economic Analysis of Compensation for 
Oil Pollution Damage, 37 J. MAR. L. & COM. 179, 215 (2006). 
 155  TAN, supra note 106, at 342. 
 156  See INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMP. FUNDS, ANNUAL REPORT 2013 
4 (2013), available at http://www.iopcfunds.org/uploads/tx_iopcpublications/ 
annualreport2013_e.pdf. 
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separate incidents.157 As noted above, a rough calculation of 
potential damages from SAI is in the range of $10–$100 billion. 
While the IOPC Funds do not approach this level, they are more 
comparable than the relatively small amount involved in the 
Cosmos 954 settlement under the Space Liability Convention. 
Several aspects of the oil spill regime policy architecture are 
noteworthy in the context of stratospheric aerosol liability. First is 
the fact that compensation levels marshaled by the regime to date 
have been adequate to satisfy damage claims brought by public 
and private parties: “The strict liability systems of compensation 
established by the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions, and by 
U.S. domestic legislation, have ensured that in practice 
compensation has nearly always been available for payment of 
claims resulting from an oil pollution incident.”158 While the lack 
of U.S. participation in the conventions has undercut the drive for 
global uniformity in oil spill liability rules, this refusal to ratify has 
been motivated not by any interest in dodging liability, but rather 
by a belief that regime coverage should be even greater than it 
is.159 
Second, the ongoing adequacy of compensation levels reflects 
the impressive institutional flexibility of the regime. Flexibility 
mechanisms such as amendment and protocol procedures are 
hardly unique to the oil spill regime, yet the adaptability they 
enable has been a key factor in the success of the Conventions and 
Funds. By using these mechanisms, parties to the regime have 
been able to enhance compensation levels over time to take 
account of increasing tanker tonnages; expanding categories of 
losses recognized by civil courts; the entry of new litigants; 
accelerating coastal development; intensified fishing and 
aquaculture; and general price inflation.160 Such flexibility has 
allowed the regime to accommodate unforeseen technological, 
economic, and legal developments. A liability regime for SAI 
geoengineering would almost certainly encounter similarly 
unanticipated occurrences, and require a comparable capacity for 
adaptability. 
Third, the fund structure pioneered by the oil spill regime 
 
 157  See id. at 4, 16. 
 158  DE LA RUE & ANDERSON, supra note 107, at 355. 
 159  See TAN, supra note 106, at 287. 
 160  See id. at 288–89. 
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offers a number of advantages that would benefit efforts to address 
SAI liability. By collecting levies prior to actual incidents, the 
IOPC Funds reassure potential victims that a pool of liquid capital 
will be available for disbursement if an accident occurs. 
Freestanding, pre-existing bodies like the IOPC Funds can help 
expedite delivery of compensation to claimants, through 
institutionalized payment mechanisms and rights of subrogation 
spelled out in the Conventions.161 Since SAI would likely be based 
on state liability, restoring losses through a compensation fund 
would perform a particularly useful diplomatic function insofar as 
it would replace direct state-to-state legal action with a less 
politicized claims process in which damages would be recovered 
from a neutral international organization such as the IOPC 
Assembly. IOPC financing arrangements, based on annual 
contributions by oil companies, also present a unique approach to 
raising funds for compensation from private sources regarded (at 
least politically) as ultimately liable for environmental damages. In 
the SRM context, oil companies and other core constituents of the 
fossil fuel industry might conceivably be compelled to provide 
funds for collective liability coverage.162 
Lastly, the critical role played by oil interests in financing the 
IOPC Funds exemplifies the key importance of industry 
involvement in the success of the oil spill regime. From the outset, 
the oil and shipping industries collaborated closely with each 
other, with their maritime state backers, and with coastal and port 
states to design and implement a liability system that would 
balance the immense economic benefits of shipping oil by sea 
against the need to provide satisfactory reparations to those who 
might suffer damage from the accidents such commerce would 
inevitably cause. While the actions of oil majors, independent 
tankers, and P&I Clubs were clearly motivated by a desire to shape 
the agenda, influence deliberations, protect commercial interests, 
and maintain some degree of control over the evolving regulatory 
framework, the net result was a liability and compensation system 
generally regarded as having benefited victims of oil pollution 
 
 161  Rights of subrogation allow for payment of claims by third parties (in this 
case, the IOPC Funds), who then assume rights to compensation from 
responsible parties (insured shipowners). CLC 92, supra note 138, art. III. 
 162  How this would align with other emerging contributory climate funds 
such as the Green Climate Fund and Adaptation Fund is unclear; the issue is 
outside the scope of this article. 
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enormously.163 Insurance payments for shipowner liability and oil 
company contributions to the IOPC Funds, mechanisms that were 
influenced and consented to by these same actors, together 
constitute the entirety of compensation payments under the regime. 
And voluntary schemes wholly conceived by industry such as 
TOVALOP and CRISTAL served as valuable interim measures 
offering relief to victims during periods of ratification, accession, 
and revision to the primary intergovernmental instruments.164 
One element of market engagement in the oil spill regime, 
however, would not be applicable to a liability system for 
stratospheric aerosol deployment. Compulsory liability insurance, 
a particularly innovative provision of the Conventions, is a device 
used in civil proceedings and designed to ensure victims receive 
adequate compensation for damages inflicted.165 Doctrines of 
sovereign and state immunity protect states from civil actions 
brought by non-state actors at home or abroad, so that 
governments are not subject to civil liability claims and cannot be 
sued for injuries.166  As previously discussed, where government 
operators are held to cause recoverable damages, liability and 
compensation are addressed outside civil courts in a state liability 
regime (such as the Space Liability Convention). In a state liability 
setting populated exclusively by sovereigns settling disputes 
through negotiation or arbitration, such as would likely 
characterize SAI, liability insurance has no role to play, since it is 
premised on rules that do not apply. Other types of insurance, 
however, may conceivably perform useful functions; for example, 
joint funds could be channeled to support sovereign disaster risk 
insurance for potential victims of SRM.167 
V. THE PROBLEM OF ATTRIBUTION 
When considering liability in the context of stratospheric 
aerosol geoengineering, an especially problematic issue relates to 
the difficulty of demonstrating causal attribution. Traditionally, 
 
 163  See, e.g., TAN, supra note 106, at 342. 
 164  See generally Gordon L. Becker, A Short Cruise on the Good Ships 
TOVALOP and CRISTAL, 5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 609, 626–32 (1974) (discussing 
TOVALOP and CRISTAL). 
 165  See HUI, supra note 135, at 95. 
 166  See JULIE A. DAVIES & PAUL T. HAYDEN, GLOBAL ISSUES IN TORT LAW 
141 (2008). 
 167  This is discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 205–209. 
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establishing legal liability has required showing a direct cause-
effect relationship between an action committed by an alleged 
wrongdoer, and damages suffered by the victim.168 In law, such 
deterministic causation is referred to as the “but for” test: but for 
factor X, would harm Y have occurred?169 If the answer is no, X is 
considered to have caused Y, liability is established, and 
compensation may be awarded. If the answer is yes, Y cannot be 
attributed to X, liability is not proven, and damage claims will not 
be satisfied. 
Determining responsibility for a fallen satellite or an oil spill 
is relatively unproblematic. But establishing an unambiguous 
direct causal connection between a stratospheric aerosol 
intervention and damages alleged to have occurred as a result is 
impossible due to the highly complex nature of the climate 
system.170 Indeed, the very concept of “climate” itself, that is, “the 
average weather, or more rigorously, . . . the statistical description 
in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a 
period of time,” is fundamentally probabilistic in nature.171 Strictly 
speaking, climate science is incapable of producing deterministic 
statements describing empirical causal chains that run from initial 
cause to final effect; instead, climate science is limited to 
statements about the probability of events occurring under 
different conditions.172 While climate science shares this 
fundamental epistemological character with all other sciences, it is 
distinguished by a very high degree of complexity and large 
uncertainties that render traditional deterministic, but-for causal 
statements about climate effects particularly problematic. 
 
 168  See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 
1775 (1985). 
 169  See generally Antony Honore, Causation in the Law, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-law/ (last 
updated Nov. 17, 2010) (discussing legal causation and the “but for” test). 
 170  See Pak-Hang Wong et al., Compensation for Geoengineering Harms and 
No-Fault Climate Change Compensation 13 (Climate Geoengineering 
Governance, Working Paper No. 008, 2014), available at http://geoengineering-
governance-research.org/perch/resources/workingpaper8wongdouglassavulescu 
compensationfinal-.pdf. 
 171  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, The Physical Science Basis, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013 1450 (Stocker, T.F., et al., eds., 2014), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/#.UwTh6vaprig. 
 172  See Myles Allen, The Scientific Basis for Climate Change Liability, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY: TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 8, 10–17 
(Richard Lord et al. eds., 2012). 
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Since liability systems generally assume that damages can be 
traced back directly to wrongful acts, efforts to address liability in 
the weather and climate field have been unsuccessful to date. Early 
attempts at cross-border regulation of weather modification 
activities foundered on the apparent impossibility of awarding 
compensation based on nondeterministic causal statements.173 
Likewise, current efforts to address issues of “loss and damage” 
within the UNFCCC are hampered by (among other things) 
controversy over attribution of specific damaging weather events 
to specific emissions of CO2 and other GHGs.
174 Future attempts to 
assign causal responsibility for particular harms to particular SAI 
interventions might, at first sight, appear unlikely to succeed for 
similar reasons. Opportunistic behavior in the context of liability 
for SRM is conceivable; for example, a country might take 
advantage of liability mechanisms by making damage claims based 
on disputable evidence that is nevertheless impossible to disprove 
due to methodological limitations. 
Contemporary advances in both computer modeling and legal 
reasoning, however, are providing possible ways around the 
attribution impasse. Climate scientists have been developing a 
number of methods to enhance the strength of claims made using 
probabilistic event attribution.175 The most prominent of these 
methods is a technique known as Fraction Attributable Risk 
(FAR).176 In essence, FAR allows researchers to quantify the 
 
 173  See Edith Brown Weiss, International Liability for Weather Modification, 
1 CLIMATIC CHANGE 267, 279 (1978); see also Lance D. Wood, The Status of 
Weather Modification Activities Under United States and International Law, 10 
NAT. RES. L. 367, 379 (1977) (explaining that the science of 1977 was not yet 
capable of determining what damages resulted from weather modification 
activities).  
 174  See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), Current Knowledge on Relevant Methodologies and Data 
Requirements as Well as Lessons Learned and Gaps Identified at Different 
Levels, in Assessing the Risk of Loss and Damage Associated with the Adverse 
Effects of Climate Change: Technical Paper, ¶112, U.N. Doc. FCCC/TP/2012/1 
(May 10, 2012). 
 175  See generally 94 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y (SPECIAL 
SUPP.) (2013) (discussing weather event attribution methods). 
 176  To calculate a fraction of attributable risk, models and observations are 
used to simulate the probability distribution of a particular climate event (such as 
a drought) in the current climate, and to simulate the probability distribution of 
the same event in a climate with a particular driver (for example, increased 
greenhouse gases or stratospheric aerosols). The change in the event’s 
probability between the two models shows the increase or decrease in likelihood 
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relative probabilities of a particular weather event occurring under 
two different climate scenarios. Models and observations are first 
used to simulate the probability distribution of a particular climate 
variable under known climate conditions. Model runs then 
simulate the probability distribution of that same variable under a 
climate characterized by an additional driver, typically increased 
GHG levels. Comparing these two distributions allows researchers 
to calculate the probabilities that the variable will exceed a specific 
weather threshold under the two different scenarios, and this in 
turn enables calculation of the increased likelihood that this 
threshold will be surpassed with the additional driver present.177 
Using FAR or similar methods, scientists have demonstrated 
probabilistic causal attribution for a growing number of discrete 
weather events, including flooding in the United Kingdom in 2000, 
the European heat wave of 2003, and drought in East Africa in 
2011.178 These and other studies show statistically significant 
increases in the likelihood that such extreme weather events 
occurred as a result of anthropogenic GHG emissions.179 In 
practice, a liability regime for stratospheric aerosols would be 
concerned with precisely these sorts of extreme events and 
resulting damages. 
At the same time as new statistical methods are increasing the 
power of causal explanations based on probability distributions, 
the use of statistical evidence is gaining wider acceptance in many 
national legal systems, supplementing the traditional reliance on 
but-for causation. English law has demonstrated a willingness to 
rely on probabilistic evidence to settle liability claims.180 In cases 
 
that is attributable to the driver in question. See Myles Allen, Liability for 
Climate Change, 421 NATURE 891, 891 (2003). 
 177  See Peter A. Stott et al., Attribution of Weather and Climate-Related 
Extreme Events, in CLIMATE SCIENCE FOR SERVING SOCIETY: RESEARCH, 
MODELING AND PREDICTION PRIORITIES 307, 315–18 (G.R. Asrar & J.W. Hurrell 
eds., 2013). 
 178  See Chris Funk, Exceptional Warming in the Western Pacific-Indian 
Ocean Warm Pool Has Contributed to More Frequent Droughts in Eastern 
Africa, 93 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 1049, 1051 (2012); Pardeep Pall 
et al., Anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas Contribution to Flood Risk in England 
and Wales in Autumn 2000, 470 NATURE 382, 382 (2011); Stefan Rahmstorf & 
Dim Coumou, Increase of Extreme Events in a Warming World, 108 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 17905 (2011); Peter A. Stott et al., Human Contribution 
to the European Heatwave of 2003, 432 NATURE 610, 610 (2004). 
 179  See Allen, supra note 172, at 17. 
 180  See Silke Goldberg & Richard Lord, England, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
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such as Novartis Grimsby v. Cookson,181 Ministry of Defence v. 
AB,182 and Sienciewicz v. Greif,183 English courts have accepted 
that, if the risk of a given event is more than doubled by a 
particular factor (or driver), that factor can be said to have caused 
the event.184  In Fairchild v. Glenhaven (a mesothelioma case), the 
House of Lords ruled that causation is demonstrated if a factor can 
be shown to have created a “material increase in risk” of an event 
happening;185 the court did not define “material increase in risk” in 
quantitative terms, but instead specified that the risk in question 
must be “not insignificant” and the allegedly tortious act must have 
“contributed substantially to the risk.”186 
In Australia, statistical evidence has formed the basis of 
decisions on liability in cases such as Seltsam Pty Ltd v. 
McGuiness,187 and “material contribution” arguments have been 
accepted in cases such as Henville v. Walker.188 South African 
courts have accepted that, if there is a greater than 50 percent 
probability that damage resulted from a particular act, that act may 
be regarded as tortious and the perpetrator held liable.189 Japanese 
courts have, as in the Minamata disease case, pioneered the 
practice of awarding compensation in proportion to the degree of 
probability that an act caused harm.190 In the United States, 
probabilistic evidence derived from statistical models has long 
served as the basis for findings of liability and damage awards in 
 
LIABILITY: TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 445, 465–70 (Richard Lord et 
al. eds., 2012). 
 181  Novartis Grimsby Ltd. v. John Cookson, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 1261, [74] 
(Eng.). 
 182  Ministry of Defence v. AB & Ors, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 1317, [151] 
(Eng.).  
 183  Sienkiewicz v. Greif (UK) Ltd., [2011] UKSC 10, [222] (appeal taken 
from Eng.). 
 184  See Goldberg & Lord, supra note 180, at 465–70. 
 185  Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd. & Ors, [2002] UKHL 22, 
[67] (Lord Hoffman). 
 186  See GIEDRE KAMINSKAITE-SALTERS, CONSTRUCTING A PRIVATE CLIMATE 
CHANGE LAWSUIT UNDER ENGLISH LAW 171–72 (2010) (quoting Fairchild v. 
Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd. & Ors, [2002] UKHL 22, [42] (Lord Nicholls), 
[47] (Lord Hoffman)). 
 187  Seltsam Pty. Ltd. v. McGuiness [2000] NSWCA 29 (Austl.). 
 188  Henville v. Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459, 493, 510–11 (Austl.). 
 189  See FRANCOIS DU BOIS ET AL., WILLE’S PRINCIPLES OF SOUTH AFRICAN 
LAW 1120 (9th ed. 2007). 
 190  See Goldberg & Lord, supra note 180, at 230 (discussing a Tokyo district 
court case on Minamata disease). 
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fields such as tobacco litigation, “toxic torts” (including 
pharmaceuticals), and radiation exposure.191 
While not always presented as such, the standard of proof for 
civil cases in most courts is a greater than 50 percent likelihood.192 
This general rule of thumb derives from the widely held principle 
that a “preponderance of evidence” is necessary to prove damage 
in a civil case, which is commonly interpreted to mean “more 
probable than not,” or greater than 50 percent.193 In modeling 
terms, this conventional standard is equivalent to a FAR greater 
than 0.5. Significantly, a number of the weather attribution 
modeling studies that have been conducted to date have 
demonstrated FARs greater than 0.5.194 
Taken together, methodological advances in climate science 
and the growing acceptance of statistical evidence in national 
courts suggest that reliance on probabilistic reasoning as proof of 
cause may offer a potential way forward in addressing the problem 
of liability attribution, both for SAI geoengineering and for climate 
policy more broadly. These converging trends point in the 
direction of an emerging, substantive alternative to conventional 
but-for, deterministic causation in cases of damage related to the 
effects of climate change. Such an alternative would allow for 
more definitive assessments of damage claims, as well as 
strengthen the ability to identify and dismiss opportunistic claims. 
Yet serious obstacles stand between these promising scientific 
and legal developments, on the one hand, and a fully realized 
climate attribution system based on probabilistic methods, on the 
other. Some critics express skepticism that model-based techniques 
will ever be able to convincingly demonstrate causation.195 It 
would undoubtedly prove challenging to gain wide scientific 
consensus on the robustness of a climate attribution system, which 
would seem a likely prerequisite for political consensus. It would 
probably be even more challenging to gain international political 
 
 191  See THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN 
THE COURTS 6–9, 124, 128, 133 (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989). 
 192  See Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, Loss Aversion, Omission Bias, and the 
Burden of Proof in Civil Litigation, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 165–66 (2012). 
 193  See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: 
PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES 113–15 (4th ed. 2012). 
 194  See Stott et al., supra note 178, at 612. 
 195  See, e.g., Mike Hulme, The Case for and Against Climate Engineering, 
OXFORD MARTIN SCHOOL (Dec. 2013), http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/ 
videos/view/334. 
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consensus. A government opposed to an attribution apparatus 
would likely have little difficulty finding scientific experts to 
question the accuracy and reliability of such a system. Since an 
effective attribution system would encompass all climate damages, 
whether caused by climate change or solar geoengineering, 
political objections to liability for conventional climate loss and 
damage may prevent acceptance of an attribution scheme intended 
for SAI. These and other issues would need to be overcome in 
order for a SAI liability regime based on statistical models to be 
adopted and implemented. However, in light of progress to date, 
the problem of attribution does not necessarily appear to present an 
insurmountable barrier to crafting a workable regime. 
If such a regime could be built, it is likely that the larger the 
SAI intervention, the easier attribution by FAR or similar methods 
would be, since (all things being equal) a larger intervention will 
create a louder signal relative to background climate noise. This 
has implications for the form an intervention might take. An 
“emergency” SAI intervention entailing a relatively large pulse of 
stratospheric aerosols, for example, would likely generate a higher 
signal-to-noise ratio than a more gradual ramping up, or “peak 
shaving,” approach to aerosol injection. An emergency 
intervention might therefore be more tractable from a liability 
perspective, but also more damaging, whereas peak shaving might 
cause less damage but elude efforts to assign attribution. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
So far, we have shown that there are a number of precedents 
on which a liability and compensation system for SAI could draw. 
Treaty systems such as the Space Liability Convention and the oil 
spill regime demonstrate that institutional mechanisms can be 
developed to effectively address some of the unavoidable risks that 
accompany internationally accepted hazardous cross-border 
activities. Furthermore, methodological and legal innovations offer 
a possible path forward for probabilistic attribution in the field of 
climate liability; these same innovations would be equally 
applicable to questions of causation with respect to stratospheric 
aerosol liability. 
These considerations raise a number of additional issues. As 
noted in the previous Section, the science of weather attribution, as 
embodied in FAR and other probabilistic attribution methods, is 
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primarily focused on extreme weather events.196 In the context of 
SAI geoengineering, these events correspond to harms of 
potentially high magnitude as denoted in Table 2 above. Given the 
current understanding of SAI geoengineering, these possibly 
extreme, potentially attributable damages consist of extraordinary 
temperature and precipitation events such as heat waves, cold 
waves, floods, droughts, and severe storms. Conceivably, a party 
responsible for SAI could be held liable for opportunity costs if 
related environmental changes can be causally attributed to an 
aerosol intervention using probabilistic methods. Returning to the 
example of Arctic hydrocarbons used earlier, if computer models 
were able to demonstrate convincingly that changes in the Arctic 
(relative to a global warming scenario) were likely caused by SAI, 
grounds would exist for damage claims based on economic 
opportunities denied by Arctic refreezing. Proving the claim and 
obtaining compensation, however, would depend on separate 
judgments regarding the foresight and reasonableness involved in 
Arctic oil and gas investments prior to SAI deployment, as well as 
prior political agreement that compensation could be awarded for 
lost opportunities. 
The essential role of attribution in liability regimes, combined 
with the critical part played by computer modeling in emerging 
climate and weather attribution methods, means that any system of 
liability and compensation for SAI geoengineering would lean 
heavily on the performance and credibility of climate models. 
Most obviously, models must be capable of demonstrating 
causation probabilistically using FAR or similar techniques in a 
methodologically rigorous and scientifically sound manner. This is 
of paramount importance from a technical point of view, and at 
least as important from a political perspective. Ultimately, in order 
for a stratospheric aerosol liability regime to work, scientists, 
policymakers, politicians, civil society, and global publics would 
all need to regard its foundational modeling system as reliable, 
accurate, independent, apolitical, and above all, legitimate. This is 
a tall order, and poses a significant challenge for any effort to build 
a liability system for SAI. 
An important function of SAI liability would be to encourage 
appropriate precaution among those involved in its 
implementation. An effective, well-executed regime creates 
 
 196  See supra text accompanying notes 178–179. 
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expectations of a durable, well-functioning governance structure 
among all parties to an agreement. Such expectations encourage 
actors to internalize norms of compliance and cooperation, and to 
develop behaviors that support and complement larger institutional 
purposes.197 In the case of a liability regime, expectations that 
unsafe or reckless behavior will result in significant penalties in 
the form of reparations can induce actors to take measures that 
minimize the chances of such costly outcomes. In the oil spill 
regime, for example, decades of effective operation have instilled 
oil and shipping interests, and their national backers, with the 
expectation that those responsible for oil spills will be held liable 
and forced to pay compensation; evidence suggests that, partly as a 
result, oil and shipping companies have made constant 
improvements to tanker design, oil containment systems, safety 
protocols, and response capabilities.198 A liability system for 
stratospheric aerosols would aim to produce a similar preventative 
effect (although achieving it via incremental regime improvements 
may be substantially more problematic in a higher-stakes 
geoengineering context). 
Enforcement presents a serious challenge to a possible future 
SAI liability regime. If liability is established, and compensation 
awarded, how would a regime function to enforce compliance with 
such a determination? In other words, what would force a guilty 
party to pay? The problem of enforcement is hardly unique to 
geoengineering; it applies to any cooperative endeavor between 
states in the anarchic international system.199 With no global 
monopoly on the use of force to police the behavior of states and 
other actors, compliance with international norms and decisions 
can only be achieved through the exercise of power, the pursuit of 
interest, or the influence of institutions, or some combination of 
these factors.200 
 
 197  See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and 
Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, in 
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 195, 220 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). 
 198  See Faure & Hui, supra note 154, at 215. 
 199  See generally KENNETH A. OYE, COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (1986) 
(discussing problems of cooperation and enforcement under conditions of 
anarchy). 
 200  See generally MICHAEL W. DOYLE, WAYS OF WAR AND PEACE: REALISM, 
LIBERALISM, AND SOCIALISM (1997) (summarizing leading theories of 
international relations). 
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The innovative design of the IOPC Funds discussed above,201 
in particular their intergovernmental legal status, suggests one 
possible way to resolve the enforcement problem for SAI liability. 
The disincentive of a guilty party to pay compensation in the 
absence of third party enforcement is obvious, but if an 
independent body authorized and funded by a multilateral group 
were made responsible for making reparations instead, the 
disincentive to pay and consequent need for enforcement would 
likely be considerably less. Indeed, lack of enforcement has been a 
nonfactor in the functioning of the oil spill regime202, which as 
described above is widely regarded as an effective system for 
delivering compensation to spill victims. By spreading the burden 
of compensation across the international community, and shifting 
decisions about the release of funds from national governments 
and finance ministries to neutral international officials insulated 
from national interests, the IOPC Funds have in effect 
depoliticized the transfer of compensation from culprit to victim. 
Theoretically, this logic could be extended to findings of 
liability itself. That is, if the decision to deploy were taken by a 
multilateral body, then it rather than individual states could be 
assigned any liability for negative side effects of the deployment. 
No precedent exists for assigning legal liability to a multilateral 
organization, as historically all liability regimes with the exception 
of the state-oriented Space Liability Convention have been based 
on civil liability.203 But the principle of international legal 
personality and related concepts would seem to provide at least a 
minimal basis for constructing a regime based on multilateral 
liability. As with compensation via intergovernmental body, 
locating legal liability with a multilateral organization would be 
likely to dampen the sorts of diplomatic and political tensions that 
can accompany accusations of wrongdoing and demands for 
reparations.204 
A further aspect of SAI liability with potential for institutional 
innovation is the form of compensation awarded to victims. 
Traditionally, compensation for international legal liability has 
 
 201  See supra Part IV. 
 202  See TAN, supra note 106, at 342. 
 203  See supra text accompanying notes 24–25. 
 204  See generally C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL 
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 2005) (discussing legal 
frameworks of international organizations). 
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taken the form of monetary payments made by those responsible 
for damage to those suffering loss.205 The resolution of the Cosmos 
954 affair exemplifies this standard means of restitution.206 
Conventional monetary payments also typify the oil spill regime, 
yet compulsory insurance for shipowners first introduced under 
CLC 69 represented a departure from past practice, and its success 
has been emulated by other liability systems.207 Although liability 
insurance is inapplicable to sovereign states (as discussed above), 
other novel insurance mechanisms currently being proposed for 
managing climate risks hold promise for transferring sovereign 
risks to insurance and reinsurance markets.208 Regime funds could 
be used to finance sovereign disaster risk insurance policies, for 
individual countries or groups of countries; in the event of loss 
attributable to SAI deployment, compensation would be paid by 
private insurance firms with potential support from multilateral 
development banks. Non-insurance mechanisms such as 
environmental assurance bonding might also be adapted to provide 
coverage for potential victims of SRM implementation.209 These 
and other innovative financial instruments could help to spread 
risk and reduce costs, particularly useful functions given the 
uncertain scale of damages that might result from SAI. 
Such instruments might also help to depoliticize the liability 
and compensation process, which as noted above could also be a 
potential advantage of both multilateral liability and multilateral 
compensation designs. However, in all likelihood considerations of 
SAI risks, harms, and restitution will remain a highly political 
undertaking. Some countries might be encouraged to claim 
damages from SAI even in the absence of compelling evidence. 
Conversely, other countries might display unwarranted levels of 
 
 205  See Survey on Liability Regimes, supra note 7, at 103–04. 
 206  See id. at 104. 
 207  See Int’l Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, supra note 156, at 16 (giving 
amount of monetary compensation paid by IOPC Funds). 
 208  See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
Mechanisms to Manage Financial Risks from Direct Impacts of Climate Change 
in Developing Countries, 75–82, U.N. Doc. FCCC/TP/2008/9 (Nov. 21, 2008), 
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/tp/09.pdf; J. DAVID CUMMINS & 
OLIVIER MAHUL, CATASTROPHE RISK FINANCING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
PRINCIPLES FOR PUBLIC INTERVENTION 20–25 (2009). 
 209  See Bidisha Banerjee, The Limitations of Geoengineering Governance in 
a World of Uncertainty, 4 STAN. J.L. SCI. & POL’Y 15, 33–35, available at 
http://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-journal-law-science-
policy-sjlsp/print/2011/05/61_banerjee_final.pdf. 
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skepticism and resistance toward SAI damage claims. Disputes 
over liability would likely place even greater stress on attribution 
modeling systems, which as noted above would already be subject 
to considerable technical and political strains. 
The politics of SAI liability would, in the end, largely reflect 
the underlying ethical commitments embedded within any 
institutional framework. The ethics of SAI liability and 
compensation would ultimately revolve around questions of who 
pays, who gets paid, and how much.210 Should the “polluter” pay, 
as is normally assumed in liability regimes, or should this 
obligation fall instead on those who benefit most from SAI, or 
alternatively on those most able to pay for damage from SAI? 
Should victims include parties harmed directly by SAI, parties who 
are harmed by SAI but benefit in net climate terms, or parties 
suffering opportunity costs or economic loss from reduced climate 
change? Should compensation be based on preindustrial, 
contemporary, or hypothesized future conditions? Answers to 
these questions are not self-evident, and can only be decided at the 
intersection of ethics, law, and power. 
Reaching political agreement on these ethical issues will be 
enormously challenging. Questions of fault and responsibility 
bedevil current negotiations on mitigation and adaptation under the 
UNFCCC. Coming to a consensus on which set of historical actors 
should be liable for damages from solar geoengineering, either 
inside or outside established negotiating tracks, will be immensely 
difficult given the significant moral and material implications of 
the question. Agreeing on eligibility for compensation will require 
resolving sensitive distributional issues between countries 
(developed versus developing), within countries (central 
government versus local victims), and between generations 
(immediate payout versus long-term trust fund). And agreeing on a 
formula for compensation will lay bare the potentially huge 
financial stakes of a stratospheric aerosol liability regime. Whose 
damage estimates will be accepted? Should compensation take into 
account separate spending on mitigation and adaptation? Should 
private flows count as compensation? These and other ethico-
political controversies will present serious obstacles to 
 
 210  See Tony Svoboda & Peter J. Irvine, Ethical and Technical Challenges in 
Compensating Harm Due to Solar Radiation Management Geoengineering 17 
ETHICS, POL’Y & ENV’T 157, 162 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/ 
10.1080/21550085.2014.927962. 
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constructing an effective SAI liability regime. While liability is not 
an insurmountable problem for solar geoengineering, neither is it a 
problem that is easily solvable. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has examined multiple, overlapping aspects of 
liability and compensation as they relate to possible stratospheric 
aerosol geoengineering: law and practice, causation and 
attribution, institutional design, and sociopolitical context. The 
purpose of this analysis has not been to recommend any particular 
approach to liability (although we have identified several 
promising structural elements). Rather, the goal has been to 
demonstrate that there is considerable precedent for managing 
international liability of the kind that would arise from SRM 
intervention; and that there is evidence that the system of 
international liability law is now evolving in ways that should 
make it still more applicable. In sum, historical precedents and 
contemporary innovations combine to suggest workable 
governance possibilities for addressing the difficult problem of 
liability for solar geoengineering. 
Experiences in other spheres have shown that the community 
of states can construct and operate instruments to address damages 
stemming from otherwise acceptable cross-border activities. Cases 
such as the Space Liability Convention and oil spill regime show 
that such arrangements can function with a large measure of 
success. State-based liability mechanisms, compensation funds, 
and other innovations such as compulsory insurance have helped 
resolve disputes between states and other international actors in 
ways that redress grievances while allowing beneficial but 
hazardous activities to continue. Some of these structures might 
prove useful in the design of a liability system for SRM 
deployment or large-scale research. The issue of attributing 
climate damages to human drivers (whether GHGs or stratospheric 
aerosols) will be of central importance to a liability system. 
Methodological advances such as FAR, and innovations in legal 
reasoning such as probabilistic causation, show great potential for 
addressing the attribution problem, but significant technical and 
political challenges remain to be overcome before an effective 
attribution apparatus can be adopted internationally. 
We have shown that there is precedent with respect to legal 
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structures. One might concede that such structures exist, but argue 
that the potential magnitude of SRM damages exceeds previous 
compensation amounts to such a degree that our analogy is false. It 
is impossible to provide precise estimates of SRM damages given 
the high uncertainties and unknown factors involved, but we have 
calculated $10–$100 billion as a rough approximation based on 
current modeling of expected damages from climate change. This 
estimate far exceeds the $6 million paid out under the Space 
Liability Convention, and is significantly higher than the $700 
million paid out by the IOPC Funds to date. Yet the total aggregate 
compensation now available under the oil spill regime is $1.3 
billion. By further comparison, the largest claim so far approved 
by the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade 
Organization, an intergovernmental body whose (non-liability) 
damage claim decisions are binding, is valued at more than $5 
billion, a sum that is arguably comparable to our lowest SAI 
damage estimate.211 We conclude that while SAI involves 
potentially larger damages, SAI damages for all but the largest 
countries—who we presume would likely be members of any SAI 
regime—are within an order of magnitude of those amounts 
contemplated and delivered by current international compensation 
regimes. Given that compensation levels under these regimes 
continue to increase, it is not unreasonable to imagine that an 
effective SAI liability regime could be created. 
In the end, questions about SAI liability will be secondary to 
more fundamental questions about whether SAI should be 
deployed, and whether geoengineering is desirable in the first 
place. These more basic questions are inherently political, and 
cannot be reduced to issues of jurisprudence or scientific 
understanding. To the extent that the possibility of a credible 
liability mechanism enhances the probability that broad political 
agreement can be reached, however, relatively narrow questions of 
liability and more general political and diplomatic questions about 
the desirability of geoengineering are inextricably bound to each 
other, and responses to them are likely to develop in tandem. For 
this reason, further research into various aspects of liability raised 
here and elsewhere promises to contribute to both the present, 
 
 211  This decision ruled affirmatively on allegations of illegal subsidies for 
aircraft manufacturing made by the European Union against the United States. 
Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/AB/R, 11 (Mar. 3, 2012).  
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more limited discussion as well as wider attempts to reach a global 
consensus on climate change and geoengineering. 
 
